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The Hedge Fund Transparency Act of 2009
Anita K. Krug
A bill that Senators Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) and Carl Levin (D-Mich.), the Hedge Fund
Transparency Act of 2009 (the “Transparency Bill”) introduced in the Senate last week
would impose certain registration and disclosure requirements on hedge funds and certain
other private funds. The bill would primarily affect funds having more than $50 million in
assets (deemed “large” investment companies) that meet the requirements of Section 3(c)(1)
or Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 to avoid being deemed an
“investment company” required to register as such under that Act.
If enacted, the Transparency Bill would require those “large” investment funds to “register
with” the SEC, maintain whatever books and records the SEC may require, and comply with
the SEC’s requests for information or examination. In addition, the Transparency Bill
would require each of those funds to file certain information with the SEC on an annual
basis, including information regarding the identity (including addresses) of the fund’s
“beneficial owners,” the amount of the fund’s assets, the fund’s equity structure, affiliations
the fund may have with other financial institutions, the minimum investment commitment
required of investors, and the total number of investors. All of this information would be
publicly available and searchable.
The Transparency Bill would also subject all private funds, regardless of asset size, to
certain requirements relating to the detection and prevention of money laundering, including
a requirement to establish anti-money laundering programs.1
Because the Transparency Bill would cover all “3(c)(1)” and “3(c)(7)” funds, it would
encompass within its purview not only so-called “hedge” funds, but also venture capital and
other private equity funds, and special-purpose structured finance entities. However, as the
Transparency Bill’s name indicates, hedge funds are the Bill’s primary targets.
In their floor statements introducing the Transparency Bill, Senators Grassley and Levin
each suggested that the Bill is a version, or an extension, of the SEC’s attempt in 2004 to
require certain investment advisers to private funds — namely, hedge fund managers — to
become registered with the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the companion
statute of the Investment Company Act. The SEC’s rule had eliminated an exemption to
investment adviser registration that had been available to advisers that managed fewer than
15 hedge funds. With the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals’ vacating the rule in 2006 on the
basis that the SEC’s adoption of it was beyond the SEC’s rulemaking authority, it was left to
Congress to require that registration. And, in 2007, Senator Grassley had proposed a bill
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Most types of financial institutions have been subject to similar requirements for years, but
the U.S. Department of Treasury in October 2008 withdrew regulations that it had proposed in 2002
that, if adopted, would have covered unregistered investment companies (such as hedge funds).
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that would have accomplished what the SEC had tried to do — require hedge fund managers
to become registered as investment advisers under the Investment Act.2
The Transparency Bill, however, is different in kind from that and subsequent recent
attempts to subject hedge funds to greater federal oversight. Rather than require hedge fund
managers to register as investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act, the
Transparency Bill would subject hedge funds themselves to registration and disclosure
requirements.3 Specifically, whereas the Investment Company Act currently excludes hedge
funds from the definition of “investment company,” the Transparency Bill would bring
hedge funds within that definition but continue to exempt them from the full panoply of
regulatory requirements to which mutual funds and other retail investment funds are subject.
Under at least the terms of the Transparency Bill, hedge fund managers, would not
themselves need to become registered with the SEC.4
Accordingly, the Transparency Bill has shifted the regulatory focus from hedge fund
managers to hedge funds themselves, and the repository of that regulation from the
Investment Advisers Act to the Investment Company Act. Although not apparent in the
Bill’s text, the shift may stem from the heightened concern among regulators that large
hedge funds create systemic risk. That is, regulators and commentators have expressed
concern that, with the increasing complexity of the financial markets and hedge funds’
pervasive role in those markets, counterparties and regulators should know more about
hedge funds’ investment positions and their concentrations—and the extent to which those
positions embody or were obtained with leverage—so that market participants may better
manage their own risk, thereby reducing the risk that financial crises will occur.5 Indeed,
Senators Grassley and Levin expressly connected their introduction of the Transparency Bill
on the need for a regulatory response to the ongoing financial crisis and, in particular, hedge
funds’ perceived role in that crisis.
The goal of reducing systemic risk may be distinguished from the objectives guiding the
SEC’s 2004 attempt to regulate hedge fund managers, which was largely predicated on the
2

See Hedge Fund Registration Act of 2007, S. 1402, 110th Cong. (2007). The Senate did not
consider that bill.
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The Transparency Bill’s focus on funds, rather than managers, renders inappropriate some of
its own terminology. In particular, one of the items that a fund would need to report to the SEC
annually is its “assets, or assets under management.” Funds are pools of capital, not investment
managers. Accordingly, although a fund may be expected to have a certain amount of assets, it
should not have “assets under management,” a phrase that is appropriate instead for describing a
fund manager.
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However, under the Investment Advisers Act, any adviser to an investment company
registered under the Investment Company Act must become registered as an investment adviser with
the SEC. Accordingly, if Congress deems large hedge funds’ compliance with the Transparency
Bill’s requirements to constitute “registration,” hedge fund managers to those funds will be required
to become registered as investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act.
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The argument has obtained further momentum by virtue of hedge funds’ participating in
some of the riskiest and complex instruments in the markets.
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notion that hedge fund managers and their investment tactics posed risk to investors in the
funds they manage. If detecting and reducing fraud is the goal, making fund managers the
focus of new regulation would seem a reasonable approach for furthering it, at least in
comparison to focusing on hedge funds themselves. By contrast, as noted above, in the
context of recent market tumult and worldwide financial crises, regulators have focused
more aggressively on the effects of the activities that large hedge funds pursue in their dayto-day operations. Given that focus, the actual market participants whose activities are seen
as creating systemic risk — hedge funds, rather than their managers — may seem the more
appropriate regulatory subject.6
If hedge funds’ activities do threaten systemic stability to the extent that regulation is needed
to mitigate that risk, it remains a question whether the Transparency Bill will serve that end.
The Transparency Bill’s disclosure requirements respond to widespread sentiment that
hedge funds’ activities should be subject to heightened requirements for information
disclosure. And, from a systemic risk perspective, information about particular investment
positions and leverage employed to obtain those positions is presumably the type of
information that would help permit regulators to determine whether a hedge fund’s
activities, whether taken alone or in combination with the activities of other market
participants, pose risks to the markets generally and how great those risks are. By its terms,
of course, the Transparency Bill would not require hedge funds to disclose that type of
information. However, perhaps most important among the Bill’s provisions is the apparent
authority it grants the SEC to obtain from hedge funds information the SEC deems
appropriate to obtain — which presumably could include portfolio holdings information.
If the SEC were to exercise that authority, would it achieve any additional protection for the
financial markets, and, if so, at what price? It may be that for information about hedge
funds’ activities to help the SEC or other analysts accurately assess the risks posed by funds’
investment activities, the SEC would need also to obtain similar information from other
market participants, such as banking institutions. As yet, however, no comprehensive
scheme to obtain that information has been proposed.
Other concerns would arise if that type of information, as with other information that private
funds will be required to submit periodically to the SEC, were to be publicly available. In
particular, if it would be possible for information that the SEC requests through its authority
under the Transparency Bill to be made public, whether as a result of the SEC’s disclosure
or as a result of FOIA requests, there would arise the risk that disclosure may affect hedge
fund investment activities in a manner that could hinder funds’ role in financial markets as
liquidity providers and sources of capital. Fund managers may cease to have sufficient
incentives to continue fund strategies and activities that they can no longer keep proprietary.

6

An additional indication the regulators may be focused more on reducing systemic risk than
protecting investors is the Transparency Bill’s requirement that large private funds disclose the
names and addresses of their investors. This requirement appears to be directly contrary to other
requirements under federal law that financial institutions (deemed to include investment funds)
implement procedures to ensure the protection of “customers’” (which would include investors’)
nonpublic personal information.
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Accordingly, if transparency requirements are to further regulators’ goals without unduly
stifling investment innovation and entrepreneurship, arguably additional data is necessary to
formulate those requirements. Ideally that data would help answer a variety of questions:
What would be the effects of disclosure on hedge fund investment activities? Would the
SEC adequately be able to assess that information without obtaining similar information
from all market participants? Does the SEC have the tools and sophistication to properly
evaluate the information — to assess risks — and take appropriate action on the basis of it?
And what actions should regulators take if and when they detect systemic risk? The
Transparency Bill implicates these additional policy questions, and as the Bill works its way
through Congress, answering these questions should be a priority.
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